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MANAGING DISSENT
TIMOTHY ZICK
In his insightful new book, Managed Speech: The Roberts Court's First
Amendment (2017), Professor Greg Magarian criticizes the Roberts Court
for adopting a "managed speech" approach in its First Amendment cases.
According to Professor Magarian, that approach gives too much power to
private and governmental actors to manage public discourse, constrain
dissident speakers, and instill social and political stability. This Article
argues that at least insofar as it relates to many forms ofpublic dissent, the
managed speech approach is both deeply rooted in First Amendment
jurisprudence and culturally prevalent. Historically, First Amendment
jurisprudence has expressed support for narrowly managed public dissent.
Expressive activities that pose no threat of actual disruption, and that do
not risk undermining social and political stability, have been granted a
preferred position. Managed speech attitudes and principles are part ofour
contemporary culture and politics. Public and private actors manage
dissent from statehouses, to college campuses, to National Football League
stadiums. Legislatures and executive officials have sought to curb public
protests, universities have acted to limit campus dissent, and the NFL has
facedpressure to dismiss players who refuse to stand at attention during the
playing of the national anthem. In these contexts, officials and private
institutions have sought to curb, tame, and marginalize public dissent.
Efforts to manage dissent cut sharply against the alternative "dynamic
diversity " model that Professor Magarian advocates in his book. Achieving
that ideal will take more than afew Supreme Court decisions. It will require
changing political and cultural attitudes concerning the meaning and value
ofpublic dissent.
INTRODUCTION
In his recently published book, Managed Speech: The Roberts Court's
First Amendment,' Professor Greg Magarian criticizes the Roberts Court
for adopting what he calls a "managed speech" approach that "seeks to
reconcile substantial First Amendment protection for expressive freedom
with aggressive preservation of social and political stability."2 Thus, in
"government preserves" such as public streets and parks, the Roberts Court
has generally upheld the authority of property owners to manage expressive
1. GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT
(2017).
2. Id. at xv.
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activities. 3 The same holds largely true, Professor Magarian argues, with
regard to public universities. 4 Private speech has been protected-one
might alternatively say tolerated-mostly insofar as it has not been
disruptive of social order or the political status quo. Professor Magarian
concludes: "The Roberts Court, with a consistency and potency unique in
the Supreme Court's history, has authorized established, powerful
mstitutions ... to exercise managerial control over public discussion, with
the apparent goal and typical result of pushing public discussion away from
destabilizing, noisy margins and toward a stable, settled center." 5
In fact, "managed speech," as Professor Magarian defines it, has long
been a staple of First Amendment jurisprudence concerning public dissent.
Although on a few occasions Professor Magarian refers to the Burger and
Warren Courts, his analysis does not, for perfectly understandable reasons,
generally cut across Courts. If it had, the study would have found that
although the Supreme Court has at times extolled the virtues of dissent and
disruption, it has generally supported public contention only insofar as the
means are peaceful and non-disruptive. As Professor Magarian charges, the
Roberts Court has generally empowered institutions to curb private dissent
and manage government preserves in ways that maintain a certain kind of
social and political stability. Although some of its decisions may have
exacerbated this situation, the Roberts Court was not working on a blank
slate. In most cases, it was applying deeply ingrained managerial speech
attitudes, principles, and doctrines.
Although we are a nation both literally and figuratively built on public
dissent, restrictions on acts of dissent-public assembly, protest, and
demonstrations-have been commonplace since at least the nineteenth
century.6 The prevailing attitude is written into the First Amendment's
Assembly Clause, which protects not the right to assemble but the right to
"peaceably" do so.7 Of course, dissenters have no First Amendment right
3. See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH Our OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN
PUBLIC PLACES (2009).
4. Many commentators have been critical of this distinction, and in particular of the Court's
"state action" doctrine which applies constitutional limitations only to an increasingly narrow category
of "state actors." See, e.g., Martha Minow, Alternatives to the State Action Doctrine in the Era of
Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and the Internet: Directing Law to Serve Human Needs, 52 HARV.
C. R.-C. L. L. REv. 145 (2017); John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis,
83 N.C. L. REv. 569 (2005); Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction,
and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2004);
Erwin Chemerinksy, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985).
5. MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at xv.
6. See generally Tabatha Abu EI-Haj, The Neglected Right ofAssembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543
(2009); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2011).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition
the Government for a redress of grievances").
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to engage in violent or criminal acts, but today's "peaceable" assemblies
and protests are managed far beyond these obvious limitations. To be sure,
political dissenters and a virtual rogue's gallery of speakers have won
notable and celebrated victories at the Supreme Court. However, as
discussed below, many of those victories occurred precisely because the
speaker did not disrupt social expectations or challenge the political status
quo. Again, the Roberts Court has followed this pattern by continuing the
Court's long tradition of upholding measures that curb and tame public
dissent.
What is more disturbing, there is mounting evidence that Americans
have largely internalized and accepted the strict management of dissent by
public and private actors. Consider the recent spate of proposals put forward
by many state legislatures that would crack down on public dissent and
protest. Starting in early 2017, and in response to high-profile public
protests, state legislatures across the nation proposed or enacted a bevy of
measures designed to manage public dissent by making it more difficult,
expensive, or even dangerous. As discussed in Part II, some of the proposals
would increase penalties for obstructing traffic or engaging in other kinds
of disruptive behavior. Others would apply rioting and racketeering laws to
protest organizers. Some would authorize the seizure of assets belonging to
protesters, in the event that a protest became violent. Further, some states
have proposed measures that would make it easier for law enforcement to
simply shut down events such as mass protests. Others, in response to
heckling incidents, have moved to impose stiffer penalties for threatening,
intimidating, or harassing public officials. Finally, a few states have
considered holding harmless any driver who inadvertently strikes a
protester who is blocking a roadway.
Executive officials have not been immune to this anti-dissent fervor. A
woman who laughed (involuntarily, she says) at the confirmation hearing
of Jeff Sessions to be Attorney General of the United States was tried and
convicted for disorderly conduct and "demonstrating" on the Capitol
grounds.9 For this audacious act of public dissent, she faced a hefty fine and
up to a year in prison. Prosecutors finally dropped the case, but only after
winning a jury verdict that was tossed out and announcing that they would
retry the case.'o On a broader scale, the Justice Department has aggressively
pursued more than 200 individuals who allegedly participated in inaugural
8. See Christopher Ingraham, Republic Lawmakers Introduce Bills to Curb Protesting in at
Least 18 States, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/ALY3-ZP29.
9. Maya Salam, Case is Dropped Against Activist Who Laughed at Jeff Sessions's Hearing,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/us/jeff-sessions-laughter-protester.
html.
10. Id.
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day protests. In that case, it sought digital records relating to participation
in public protests and charged the group of protesters with felony
conspiracy to engage in a riot."
Unfortunately, these are not the only examples that suggest a strong
backlash against public forms of dissent. As discussed below, at many
colleges and universities, administrators have cracked down on offensive
and disruptive expression by students, faculty, and outsiders. They have
adopted and enforced detailed codes that model the regulatory regime
applicable outside campus to places within campus gates.' 2 Some
universities have disinvited or refused to host controversial outside
speakers.' 3 Some students have likewise embraced managed speech. For
example, students have physically interfered with access by outside
speakers or reacted violently to their presence. Others have interrupted
invited speakers whose messages they consider too controversial or hurtful.
Students have also used their own free speech rights to shout down
speakers. All of this activity has resulted in the effective silencing of
speech, in the name of keeping students safe from certain controversial
messages or speakers. In response, lawmakers and administrators are
beginning to respond with a cure that may be as bad as or worse than the
disease. For instance, the University of Wisconsin recently adopted student
conduct rules that would result in the suspension and possible expulsion of
students who engage in what is arguably a form of counter-speech.1 4 This
sort of administrative response could further suppress the vigorous
exchange of ideas on university campuses.
Managed speech has also been manifested more broadly, in notable
social and political conflicts. The recent controversy concerning NFL
players' racial justice protests during pre-game ceremonies, in particular
during the singing of the national anthem, are one example. Official
pressure has been brought to bear on these dissenters. President Trump has
opined that players should stand at attention during the national anthem and
flag ceremonies, or be disciplined by team owners and managers for failing
to do so.' 5 A state legislator recently introduced a bill that would entitle fans
to a refund in the event they had to witness such an offensive form of
11. See Timothy Zick, Protests in Peril, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 20, 2017, 1:00 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/civil-wars/articles/2017-1l -20/prosecuting-inauguration-day-
protesters-puts-free-speech-in-peril.
12. See generally ZICK, SPEECH Our OF DOORS, supra note 3, ch.8 (discussing spatial and other
limits on campus expression).
13. See GREG LUKIANOFF, FREEDOM FROM SPEECH 29-36 (2014) (discussing "disinvitation
season" on university campuses).
14. Todd Richmond, University of Wisconsin Approves Policy That Punishes Student Protesters,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/QQW6-QK8X.
15. Associated Press, Trump Says NFL Players Should be Fired forAnthem Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/sports/trump-nfl-colin-kaepernick-.html.
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dissent.' 6 Some fans have also sued for refunds, alleging that the anthem
dissents nullify their season ticket purchases.' 7 The First Amendment may
not be formally implicated in this controversy, since (thus far, at least) no
government official has taken any direct action against the players or
coerced management to discipline or fire them. However, the fact that a
silent, peaceful protest has generated such public controversy-even
outrage in some quarters-is telling. Apparently, many Americans view the
peaceful expression of dissent on a matter of critical public concern as an
act of disrespect to the nation.
Managed dissent is rooted in our First Amendment history and
jurisprudence. It is manifested in recent proposals for further narrowing or
punishing the exercise of public dissent. It is evident on many of our public
and private campuses. And it is threatening to drive out public professions
of dissent by casting them as disrespectful, disruptive, and even unpatriotic.
Professor Magarian proposes a different approach, which he calls
"dynamic diversity."' Dynamic diversity seeks to facilitate the
communication of diverse ideas and participation by diverse speakers. It
pushes back against the managerial power that the Court has permitted
officials, administrators, and private institutions to exercise. However, to
change this situation, to rise above and perhaps escape managed speech,
will take more than a few decisions by the current or future Supreme Court.
As my examples show, to achieve something like dynamic diversity in our
free expression culture will require more than a change in judicial attitude
or doctrine. It will require a concerted effort by a diversity of managers-
lawmakers, college administrators, and private employers-to facilitate
those goals. More broadly, achieving the goals of dynamic diversity will
require broad-scale attitudinal changes among our citizens regarding the
purposes and values of public protest and dissent.' 9
Part I of the Article discusses Professor Magarian's conception of
"managed speech." It argues that the management of public protest and
dissent is deeply rooted in First Amendment precedents, concepts, and
principles. Our First Amendment jurisprudence has structured public
protest by favoring non-disruptive speakers, delegating control of public
properties to public managers, and limiting contacts with "outsiders." The
Roberts Court's First Amendment decisions have followed this
jurisprudential tradition by generally supporting public speech rights only
insofar as they do not pose any serious threats to public order and stability.
16. Cindy Boren, Indiana Legislator Pushes Bill Requiring Colts to Refund Money to Fans
Offended by National Anthem Protests, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/4QXN-D7YT.
17. Id.
18. See MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at xvi-xx.
19. Id. at xvii.
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Part II looks outside and beyond the Supreme Court to current examples
of managed dissent within the body politic. It focuses on the three contexts
mentioned earlier-public demonstrations, campus dissent, and
professional athlete protests. In each of these contexts, there has been a
significant backlash against public protest and dissent. Public and private
actors have moved to curb or quash public contention. Working from
something similar to the template of managed speech, they have proposed
or enforced limits on public rallies, restrictions on campus dissent, and
public displays of protest. In these and other quarters, dissent is not viewed
as a patriotic exercise or civic duty. Instead, it is increasingly perceived as
a threat to public unity and an act of disrespect.
Part III assesses the prospects for resisting the management of dissent
and adopting something like the "dynamic diversity" approach supported
by Professor Magarian. The Supreme Court can and should play a role in
encouraging a diversity of ideas and a diversity of participants. However,
as my examples will show, whether dynamic diversity stands a fighting
chance will depend more on the managers, political leaders, and public
audiences that can create the conditions for its adoption. If free speech is to
be "an engine of political and social change," as Professor Magarian
advocates, we will need more than a Supreme Court dedicated to this goal.2 0
We will need to draw on another First Amendment tradition: a commitment
to public protest and dissent not just as civil liberties but as civic duties.21
I. "MANAGED SPEECH"
A. Dissent and Public Protest in the Roberts Court Era
As Professor Magarian observes, judged by the results of many of its
First Amendment decisions, the Roberts Court might be characterized as a
champion of freedom of expression. In a number of cases, the Court has
ruled in favor of First Amendment claimants. In the process, it has extended
protection to some unsavory and offensive speakers.
In his study of Roberts Court First Amendment decisions, Professor
Magarian takes a more critical view of the Court's free expression
jurisprudence. He argues that the Roberts Court has generally adopted a
"managed speech" approach to First Amendment issues. By this he means
that the Court has generally authorized public and private actors "to
exercise a strong measure of managerial control over public discussions."22
20. Id.
21. See generally STEPHEN D. SOLOMON, REVOLUTrIONARY DISSENT: HOW THE FOUNDING
GENERATION CREATED THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2016).
22. MAGARIAN, supra note I, at xv.
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Professor Magarian claims that the Court has "disregarded the expressive
interests and First Amendment claims of outsider speakers" and shown "a
consistent preference for modes of public discussion that promote social
and political stability, while disfavoring modes of public discussion that
threaten to destabilize existing arrangements of social and political
power." 23
I do not agree with the manner in which Professor Magarian
characterizes all of the Roberts Court's free expression decisions. However,
particularly with regard to decisions concerning dissent and public protest,
I agree with his thesis that the Roberts Court has embraced a "managed
speech" approach. The Roberts Court has not been a strong champion of
contentious displays,, disruptive modes of speech, or potentially
destabilizing demonstrations of political dissent. Even in decisions
upholding free speech and other expressive claims, the Court has
demonstrated a preference for methods of protest and dissent that do not
threaten the social and political status quo.
Thus, as Professor Magarian shows, in public fora and other
"government preserves" the Roberts Court has authorized public officials,
within broad parameters, to manage and control expression.24 As property
owners, officials exercise broad discretion to control the when, where, and
how of public discourse. To take an example from the Roberts Court era,
in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court reviewed a Massachusetts law that
narrowly constrained "sidewalk counseling" near abortion clinics.25
Although it ultimately invalidated the law, the Court refused to treat it as
aimed at suppressing dissent near abortion clinics (although it only applied
near such facilities and exempted clinic employees from its restrictions).26
As Professor Magarian notes, although the speakers won the case,
McCullen only appears to reflect support for contentious speech in the
public forum. As the Court emphasized, the "sidewalk counselors" were
not actually engaged in "protest" at all.27 According to the Court, they
sought only to engage in a peaceful, orderly, and reserved conversation with
their intended audience-women seeking access to health care facilities. 2 8
McCullen is thus not a "protest" case. It does not signal any retreat from the
recognition of managerial authority with regard to protests in public fora. It
does not address, much less bid to challenge, the authority to maintain
social stability on the public streets and sidewalks. Rather, McCullen
23. Id. (emphasis in original).
24. Id.
25. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
26. See id. at 2530-34.
27. Id. at 2536.
28. Id.
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recognizes a relatively narrow right to engage in a quiet and orderly form
of face-to-face conversation on public sidewalks. So long as this kind of
speech does not disrupt, interrupt, or otherwise threaten public order,
government power to restrict or ban the speech is limited.
As Professor Magarian claims, governments have other means of
managing speech in the "preserves" they own and operate. For example,
they frequently condition the receipt of government funds or benefits on
forms of expression the government-as-subsidizer favors. Thus, in
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Roberts Court held that a public
law school could condition its official recognition of student groups on their
obligation to accept "all comers."2 9 This meant that the Christian Legal
Society (CLS) could not reject potential members-even if they did not
ascribe to the group's specified commitments regarding sexual activity and
homosexual conduct in particular. Under this rule, the campus Democrats
could not turn away committed Republicans who wanted tojoin their group.
Notably, the Roberts Court decided the case under the rubric of the "public
forum," holding that the law school's student recognition program was a
form of subsidy-a "limited public forum"-as to which it could apply any
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restrictions.30 Martinez concluded that
CLS's dissenting view with regard to matters of sexuality, as well as its
claim of associational freedom, had to yield to the law school's preferred
position that "all comers" be eligible for group membership.
McCullen and Martinez are examples of how Roberts Court decisions
have empowered governmental owners and funders to control expression
through the powers of management and subsidy. These decisions allow
government officials to shape public discourse by controlling rights to
speak and associate in government preserves.
As Professor Magarian shows, Roberts Court decisions with respect to
private speech-speech that exists separate and apart from any
governmental support for it-have also recognized the broad authorities of
public and private managers. In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court invalidated a
sizeable civil verdict, based on an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, against a group that protested near a funeral for a military
veteran.3 ' The group, the Westboro Baptist Church, infamously used the
occasion of military funerals to protest the U.S. military, policies relating
to LGBT rights, and the Catholic Church.32 They chanted and held up signs
saying things like "God Hates Fags" and "Thank God for IEDs."3 3
29. 561 U.S. 661, 696-97 (2010).
30. Id. at 679-83.
31. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
32. Id. at 448, 454.
33. Id. at 448-49.
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On its face, Snyder seems like a decision that embraces a deeply
offensive and disruptive form of political protest. However, as it did in
McCullen, the Court took pains to note that the protesters were in a place
they had a right to be and were otherwise in compliance with all local laws
concerning time, place, and manner regulations.34 As the Court observed,
the protesters "did not yell or use profanity, and there was no violence
associated with the picketing."" As the Court also noted, the plaintiff did
not actually see or hear the protesters on the day of the funeral.36
Snyder seems like a significant victory for public protesters. However,
although Snyder prohibits government from imposing civil liability for
"outrageous" political dissent, it does not prevent government from
enacting laws that effectively displace protesters-even, perhaps, to the
extent that they cannot be seen or heard. Indeed, both before and after
Snyder, states, localities, and the federal government have imposed strict
limits on funeral protests.37 As Professor Magarian correctly observes,
Snyder does not affect those efforts. Indeed, by mentioning the alternative
of zoning out the speech of funeral protesters, the decision tacitly approves
of them.
The Roberts Court also held that the federal government can restrict
private political speech that crosses international borders. In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project (HIP), the Court upheld a federal law that
prohibits any person from providing "material support" to designated
"foreign terrorist organizations."" A group of Americans filed a pre-
enforcement challenge to the law. They wanted to assist designated foreign
terrorist organizations with lawful educational and legal activities.
Specifically, they wanted to help the organizations file petitions at the
United Nations and provide them with instruction concerning principles of
international law. 3 9
The Roberts Court held that the law was valid as applied to these
activities and any other form of expression that is "coordinated with, or
controlled by foreign terrorist groups."40 It concluded that the government
had compelling national security and foreign relations interests, and that the
law furthered those interests by narrowly proscribing forms of
34. Id. at 448, 457, 460.
35. Id. at 449.
36. Id.
37. See ZICK, SPEECH Ottr oF DooRS, supra note 3, at 124-28 (discussing funeral protest zoning
cases).
38. 561 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2010); see 18 U.S.C. § 2339(b)(a)(1) (prohibiting provision of "material
support" to foreign terrorist organizations).
39. Id. at 36-38.
40. Id. at 36.
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"coordinated" expression and association that might indirectly facilitate the
violent ends of the foreign terrorist organizations. 4 1
Consider, finally, a decision that was handed down after Professor
Magarian's book was published, but which also fits the managerial model.
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Roberts Court unanimously
invalidated a state law that effectively barred released sex offenders from
visiting a wide variety of internet websites, including the most popular
social network sites.42 The decision contains soaring dicta about the
importance of cyber speech and cyber places.4 3 However, the Court's actual
holding does nothing to challenge or upset the broad public and private
regulatory authority that service providers and others exercise over cyber
speech. As it had in in Snyder, the Packingham Court emphasized that a
narrower law targeting certain online activities would likely survive First
Amendment scrutiny.. More generally, the Court did not question the
underlying public-private distinction that permits private owners to restrict
speech in ways that would otherwise violate the First Amendment. In other
words, for all its lofty dicta, Packingham does not announce a public forum
doctrine for cyber places. The decision accepts and applies the existing
managerial framework for speech in those places.
In sum, with regard to both expression in "government preserves" and
private expression, the Roberts Court has applied a managerial approach
that allows officials and private actors to continue to exercise significant
control over public protest and private expression. It has recognized this
authority with respect to public sidewalks, public campuses, international
borders, and cyberspaces. First Amendment decisions like McCullen,
Snyder, and Packingham, which on the surface appear to embrace broad
First Amendment rights, actually do relatively little to protect public or
private expression. As Professor Magarian observes, these and other
decisions grant public and private authorities broad power to manage
speech in a variety of contexts and fora.
B. Our Managed Speech Tradition
As noted, the "managed speech" approach Professor Magarian identifies
did not spring forth anew from the Roberts Court. As Professor Magarian
observes, on at least a few occasions, in many instances the Roberts Court
was applying longstanding First Amendment managerial attitudes,
41. Id. at 33-37.
42. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
43. See id. at 1735 ("While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most
important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is
cyberspace-the 'vast democratic forums of the Internet' in general .... ) (citations omitted).
44. See id. at 1737 (discussing narrower laws).
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principles, and doctrines. With respect to dissent and public protest in
particular, the Roberts Court thus far has mostly ratified and applied a
managed speech tradition that is deeply rooted in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Thus, while its decisions may have exacerbated some of the
problems associated with the managerial model, the Roberts Court was
hardly working from a blank slate.
1. Robust, Uninhibited, Wide Open: Provoking, Inducing Unrest, and
Stirring to Anger
The lore of our First Amendment, in particular the Free Speech Clause,
is that it protects vocal, offensive, and disruptive forms of public dissent.
Americans boast that the right to offend and disturb is part of the freedom
the First Amendment protects, indeed part of an exceptional American
speech culture.
This attitude has sometimes been reflected in Supreme Court decisions.
In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, for example, the Court wrote that speech
"may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger."4 5 The Court went on to note that "[s]peech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an
idea."4 6 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which altered the nation's libel
laws to create breathing space for criticism of government officials, the
Supreme Court wrote that debate on public matters should be "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open." 4
7
However, insofar as the First Amendment is concerned, a far more
conservative attitude with regard to public expression has typically
prevailed. Dissent that induces unrest, stirs to anger, or creates
dissatisfaction with the status quo has not received the favored or celebrated
status suggested by the rhetoric in cases like Terminiello and Sullivan.
Indeed, First Amendment jurisprudence has long preferred "safer" forms of
dissent. Thus, despite the obvious importance of protecting dissent in times
of war and conflict, the Supreme Court's World War I-era free speech cases
consistently upheld lengthy prison terms for speakers who distributed
political pamphlets or made political speeches. Justice Holmes's now-
famous dissents, which objected to the application of the "clear and
[present] danger" standard, did so in part because the speakers were "puny
45. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
46. Id.
47. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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anonymities" who conveyed "silly" ideas. 48 Holmes's characterizations
suggested that the speech and speakers most worthy of First Amendment
coverage and protection were those that posed the least threat to social
stability and political order.
Of course, as scholars have noted, officials have tended to give less
protection to freedom of speech and other expressive rights during times of
war. 49 However, even in its earliest cases upholding public speech rights,
the Hughes Court was willing to protect public dissent only if it was
carefully managed, didn't stir anyone to anger, and did not threaten any
serious disruption. For instance, the Court overturned a breach of peace
conviction against a Jehovah's Witness in part because he was "upon a
public street, where he had a right to be, and where he had a right peacefully
to impart his views to others."o There was no evidence, observed the Court,
that the speaker's "deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or
offensive."" He demonstrated no "intentional discourtesy."52 The Witness
did not intend to "insult or affront" his public audience." In another early
case, the Court observed that epithets and swear words (also known as
"fighting words") directed at a person "without a disarming smile" were
not entitled to coverage under the Free Speech Clause.54 In that case, the
speaker, another Jehovah's Witness, had the audacity to call a public
official a "damn Fascist" and "a God damned racketeer."
To be sure, some of these early decisions were critically important
victories for public speech and assembly rights. They established, for
example, that speakers had a right to use the public sidewalks and streets to
communicate with public audiences. However, they also clearly and
consistently indicated that public forms of dissent and protest were more
likely to receive coverage and protection under the Free Speech Clause
insofar as they did not pose any serious challenge to social order, cause any
actual disruption, or threaten the status quo. Thus, a speaker who peacefully
and non-truculently communicated on the streets was assured of some First
Amendment protection (if not protection from angry mobs). But a speaker
who communicated with the intent to offend a public audience, without a
"disarming smile," or with the wrong bearing, was not so assured.
48. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 627.
49. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1870 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004); THOMAS R. REED, AMERICA'S TWO
CONSTIuRrrIONS: A STUDY OF THE TREATMENT OF DISSENTERS IN TIMES OF WAR (2017).
50. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 310.
53. Id. at 309.
54. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
55. Id. at 569.
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Later, the Court sanctioned measures designed to protect speakers from
hostile crowds who might be offended by their speech or moved to violence
because of it. In Feiner v. New York, the Court upheld the disorderly
conduct conviction of a speaker who called political figures, including
President Truman, "bums" and suggested that African-Americans should
"rise up" and fight for their equality rights." Feiner was arrested owing to
the reaction of onlookers, some of whom were offended or agitated by his
speech. His remarks had apparently "stirred up a little excitement." 5 One
of the onlookers told police officers on the scene: "If you don't get that son
of a bitch off, I will go over and get him off there myself." 59 Instead of
arresting the onlooker, the police arrested Feiner-for his refusal to stop
speaking when ordered to do so. The Court upheld the conviction, citing
the city's overriding interest in "peace and order on its streets." 60
This pattern, again particularly with regard to public protest and dissent,
generally held even during what many view as the heyday of freedom of
expression-during the Warren Court and civil rights eras. To be sure, civil
rights protesters won important First Amendment victories relating to
public dissent. But the movement itself was committed to peaceful methods
of protest; the violence and disruption typically came from officials and
private parties opposed to the movement. Although in some post-Feiner
civil rights cases the Court invalidated breach of peace convictions on what
seemed like very similar facts, it again emphasized that those assembled
were engaged in passive demonstrations and peaceful marches. 6 ' Although
these were significant victories for the protesters and more generally for the
civil rights movement, note that they rested on the notion that public dissent
and protest was worthy of protection so long as it did not pose any actual
risk to public order.
Other cases from the civil rights era adopted a similar perspective
concerning the scope of public dissent. The Court upheld the free speech
right to engage in a silent civil rights protest in a public library reading
room.62 It held that public elementary and junior high school students could
wear black armbands in silent protest of the Vietnam War-that is, so long
as their speech did not "materially disrupt or invade the rights of others." 63
56. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
57. Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 317.
59. Id. at 330.
60. Id. at 320.
61. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (invalidating breach of peace
convictions of civil rights protesters); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965) (also invalidating
breach of peace convictions of civil rights protesters).
62. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (overturning convictions of group that
refused to leave public library reading room when asked).
63. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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But when civil rights protesters got too close for comfort to government
buildings such as schools and jailhouses, the Court did not hesitate to
uphold their breach of peace and disorderly conduct convictions.' And the
Court saw no merit in First Amendment challenges to segregation in public
accommodations like lunch counters.65
I do not mean to suggest that the Warren Court and Burger Court failed
to recognize, and even expand upon, First Amendment rights to
communicate public dissent and to criticize government. After all, the
Court refashioned tort law to permit speakers to engage in robust and
sometimes caustic criticism of government.6 6 The Court also articulated
strong defenses of what might be considered offensive forms of dissent. In
Cohen v. California, the Court overturned the conviction of a man who
wore a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" into the corridor
of a public courthouse-in part, though, because no one in the corridor was
apparently stirred to anger or even much disturbed by the jacket.67
However, despite the liberalization of public speech and dissent rights,
First Amendment precedents have not eagerly embraced speech that
"created conditions of unrest" or "stirred people to anger."" Indeed, our
free speech narrative of "uninhibited and wide-open discourse" has actually
been more myth than reality-an aspirational story we tell ourselves about
robust expressive rights. In fact, the First Amendment has mostly protected
speakers who towed a certain line in terms of accepted social and political
behavior. Silent protests and expressive activities that did not upset
sensibilities have generally been treated as protected speech-but not
burning a draft card as part of an otherwise peaceful public protest,
protesting near a jail where political prisoners were being held, uttering
"dirty words" on the radio as part of a political commentary about language
repression, or sleeping overnight in a park near the U.S. capitol.69 These
forms of expression were all considered too "robust," "uninhibited," or
"wide-open" to merit full First Amendment protection.
Even Brandenburg v. Ohio,7 0 which narrowed the standard for
"incitement" and created breathing space for political dissent, involved the
64. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 405 U.S. 39, 46 (1966) (upholding trespass convictions of civil
rights protesters situated in curtilage ofjailhouse).
65. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961) (invalidating breach of peace
convictions in sit-in case on procedural due process grounds).
66. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (invalidating state libel laws).
67. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
68. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
69. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 371 (1968) (upholding conviction for public
burning of draft card); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding order limiting time of day when
indecent speech could be broadcast on the radio); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984) (upholding restrictions on overnight camping in national parks).
70. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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sort of "anonymities" Justice Holmes was referring to in his early dissent.
A group of KKK members one could only describe as clownishly non-
threatening had burned some crosses in a rural Ohio field. 7' They talked of
taking "revengeance" against the government and marching on
Washington, D.C. and perhaps other places. 72 Like other public speakers
who prevailed in First Amendment challenges, this group was an orderly,
non-disruptive, and decidedly non-threatening group.
2. The Public Order Management System
The roots of our managed speech tradition go much deeper than this
preference for non-threatening and non-disruptive speakers. First
Amendment doctrines relating to speech on public properties and regulation
of the time, place, and manner of expression have long reflected this
attitude. In general, these doctrines have imposed a public order
management system on dissent and protest. They have made it more
difficult, and more costly, to engage in public protests and demonstrations.
Public properties and other "government preserves" (as Professor
Magarian refers to them) are managed under a regime that combines official
control over access to public places with power to enforce content-neutral
limits on the "time, place, and manner" of expression in those places. 7 3 As
I have explained at length elsewhere, this "public order management
system," which has been in place since the 1970s, has significantly
narrowed the scope and contours of our "expressive topography"-the
places where expressive activity is allowed to occur-and restricted the
ability of speakers to reach intended audiences. 74 Those wishing to engage
in disruptive forms of public protest must now run a daunting gauntlet of
permit requirements, free speech zones and other physical barricades,
aggressive law enforcement tactics, and public order laws.
Although some of these measures have been successfully challenged,
courts generally defer to governmental managers' interests in order, safety,
and even aesthetics. 75 Under the managerial regime, public contention that
disturbs the peace, interferes with residential or personal tranquility, or
71. Id. at 445.
72. Id. at 446.
73. For a discussion of the challenges this regime poses for public protests, demonstrations, and
other events, see generally ZICK, SPEECH Our OF DOORS, supra note 3.
74. See generally id. at ch.2 (explaining the management system that affects public expression
and the concept of the "expressive topography"); see also John D. McCarthy & Clark McPhail, The
Institutionalization of Protest in the United States, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SOCIETY 83 (David S.
Meyer & Sydney Tarrow eds. 1998).
75. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981); Clark v. Cnty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 296 (1984).
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proffers speech to unwilling audiences may be restricted or suppressed.76
This is the regime that governs cases like McCullen which, as noted, upheld
the sidewalk counselor's free speech claim but left undisturbed the core of
the managerial framework.
Constitutional doctrine has been even less protective of dissent and
protest in non-governmental preserves. In this context, the managerial
approach is deeply rooted in principles of state action and private property
rights. Marsh v. Alabama held that a Jehovah's Witness distributing leaflets
on the streets of a "company town" could raise a First Amendment defense
to his arrest.7 7 However, Marsh is an outlier insofar as private properties
are concerned. For example, the Court has held that privately owned and
operated shopping malls are not part of the First Amendment's expressive
topography. Even though these places often operate as the functional
equivalent of public streets and plazas, speakers have no access to them for
purposes of the First Amendment.7 ' The spaces that are meaningfully open
for purposes of public dissent and protest are generally limited to the public
streets, parks, and most sidewalks.
Despite its dicta concerning the Internet-as-public forum, cases like
Packingham are governed by this aspect of the managed speech framework.
Access to Facebook and Twitter are determined by the private owners and
managers of those spaces, as dictated by their terms and conditions. Dissent
and protest are obviously allowed in cyberplaces, and at least in some
quarters this expression is wide open and robust. But as of this moment,
this is a function of the grace of private intermediaries, who are not required
to comply with the First Amendment. Profits and public relations, not
constitutional principles, determine both how much and what kind of
dissent can occur there.
3. Managing Transborder Speech and Association
Professor Magarian is rightly critical of the Roberts Court's treatment of
transborder speech and association rights in HLP. However, fear and
rejection of "foreign" political expression is yet another basic hallmark of
our managed speech tradition.79 That tradition includes a stunning lack of
recognition of the many values relating to cross-border and beyond-border
expression.
76. See, e.g., Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S 474, 484 (1984) (recognizing residential privacy and
tranquility as substantial interests); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000) (recognizing right of
"privacy" in some "confrontational settings").
77. 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
78. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
79. See generally TIMOTHY ZICK, THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTING
TRANSBORDER EXPRESSIVE AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS (2014).
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At and beyond U.S. borders, First Amendment rights have long been
treated as quasi-constitutional rights.so The judicial "quasi-recognition" of
transborder First Amendment rights has entailed a reluctance to fully
recognize and justify these rights; articulation of unique limitations on
transborder rights; demotion or devaluation of certain transborder activities,
such as the right to travel; substantial reliance on federal immigration and
foreign affairs powers; and reflexive deference to national security
concerns.81
In this particular context, which has long gone nearly unnoticed by First
Amendment scholars, courts have provided only the meekest coverage and
protection for free speech and associational rights. As I explain elsewhere,
the provincial or parochial perspective regarding transborder First
Amendment rights extends at least as far back as the founders' own fear of
foreign influence.82 Thus, HLP is rooted in a longstanding parochial
tradition that treats transborder speech and association as inherently
dangerous and generally outside the domain of ordinary First Amendment
rules and principles.
In one important respect, in HLP, the Roberts Court expanded the
government's traditional degree of control with regard to cross-border
speech and association. The Court retreated from Cold War precedents that
had recognized the right to join associations that conducted peaceful
political activities.83 Thus, the Roberts Court authorized the government to
use the "material support" law to prosecute political collaboration even
where the government had not proven any intent to further the violent and
criminal activities of the organization. In this sense, HLP exacerbated the
difficulties Americans face when they seek to communicate or associate
with persons and institutions located beyond U.S. borders.
Professor Magarian ably chronicles the Roberts Court's embrace of
"managed speech." As he shows, the Court has not been a full-throated
champion of outsiders, disruptive protesters, and other dissidents. Even
decisions that have enforced the First Amendment rights of such
individuals have done so only insofar as they act in ways that do not
challenge or upset social order and stability. However, in most instances,
particularly with regard to public dissent and protest, the Roberts Court was
working within a longstanding managed speech framework.
80. See id. at 70-74.
81. Id. at 71.
82. Id. at 62-66.
83. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (holding that mere association
with a group that uses unlawful means to achieve its ends does not forfeit First Amendment associational
rights).
2018] 1439
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
II. MANAGED DISSENT BEYOND THE ROBERTS COURT
Managed speech principles are deeply ingrained not just in First
Amendment jurisprudence but in American free speech culture more
generally. This Part examines some recent examples of efforts to control
public dissent and protest in the managed speech tradition. Recent
proposals for limiting or suppressing public protests and demonstrations,
campus dissent, and professional athletes' symbolic expressions of dissent,
show the extent to which the managed speech approach has penetrated
American free speech culture. In each of these examples, dissent and protest
are being actively managed by public and private actors who wish to impose
order and stability. Although constitutional doctrines and principles provide
the framework under which protest and dissent are managed in these
contexts, courts have played only a small role. The examples highlight both
the extent to which our speech is managed speech and the challenges for
Professor Magarian's conception of "dynamic diversity."
A. Curbing Public Protests
I have already mentioned the managerial controls that are authorized
under the First Amendment's public forum and time, place, and manner
doctrines. In response to some recent public protests, state officials have
proposed even tighter and more restrictive measures, all designed to tame
and curb public protest. Many of these measures have not yet become law.
However, the mere fact of their introduction is indicative of a shift toward
imposing greater control over public dissent and protest. Whether they
become law today, future public protests will likely provide an impetus for
revisiting these and similar proposals.
In general, the measures, which have been proposed in eighteen states
thus far, would make public protest more difficult, more expensive, or even
physically dangerous. They include the following:
* Making it a felony to block a highway;
* Significantly increasing the amount of civil fines for obstructing
traffic or trespassing;
* Authorizing police to shut down public protests, including by "any
means necessary;"
* Making it a crime to leave an "unlawful assembly;"
* Allowing businesses to sue individuals who target them with
protests;
* Increasing fines for "mass picketing" behavior;
* Prohibiting the wearing of masks, robes, or other disguises during
public protests and demonstrations;
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* Permitting localities to charge protesters for the costs of policing
events;
* Exempting drivers from liability if they strike protesters under
certain circumstances;
* Pursuing protesters under anti-racketeering laws, including asset
forfeiture provisions;
* Making it a crime to threaten, intimidate, or retaliate against current
or former state officials; and
* Requiring public community colleges and universities to expel any
student convicted of participating in a violent riot.84
The national clamp down on protest and dissent has generated both
domestic and international criticism. In the U.S., civil libertarians have
objected that public officials are seeking to deter public dissent by
criminalizing acts of public protest. In the international arena, the United
Nations published a report suggesting that lawmakers in the U.S. were
placing basic human rights relating to freedom of speech and assembly in
jeopardy."
Some of the measures would likely violate the First Amendment, which
may partly explain why they have not become law. Measures aimed directly
at suppressing particular protests, that apply racketeering laws to even
peaceful protests, that require protesters to cover the full cost of policing
lawful demonstrations, and that release drivers from liability for running
down protesters so long as they did so only negligently, have the purpose
or likely effect of criminalizing or otherwise punishing lawful expressive
activities. At least in most applications, such laws would likely violate the
First Amendment.
However, under the managerial framework discussed earlier, some of
the proposals might well survive First Amendment scrutiny. Many
measures already on the books, including permitting requirements and
financial indemnification provisions, significantly burden public protests
and demonstrations. Some of the proposed additional burdens, including
increased fines and criminal penalties for seemingly minor offenses, would
make it more difficult to mount effective public protests. This burden would
be measured against the state's interests in maintaining public order and
84. These examples are reported in Christopher Ingraham, Republic Lawmakers Introduce Bills
to Curb Protesting in at Least 18 States, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/HTG5-NRVW
and Traci Yoder, NewAnti-Protesting Legislation: A Deeper Look, NAT'L LAW. GUILD (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://perma.cc/P5UT-6MMV.
85. See Harriet Agerholm, More Than 20 US States Have Cracked Down on Protests Since
Donald Trump's Election, INDEPENDENT (May 9, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://perma.cc/MKU4-6RK8
(quoting UN report).
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safety. When such balancing occurs, courts often defer to officials charged
with keeping peace and order.
My point is not to litigate the constitutionality of these proposals.
Whether or not they would survive First Amendment scrutiny, the bills
express an unambiguous desire to crack down on and curb public dissent.
As noted earlier, many of the measures were introduced in direct response
to particular protests, including minimum wage demonstrations, indigenous
protests of the Standing Rock pipeline, Black Lives Matter protests in
Ferguson, Missouri, and protests relating to Donald Trump's election as the
nation's forty-fifth president.86 The Ferguson protests were marked by
violence and looting, which of course can be proscribed. But it is telling
that, in each instance, the reaction to protest events was to find ways to
punish or deter even peaceful but sometimes disruptive forms of dissent and
protest.
Of course, in times of public turmoil, it is not unusual to see some degree
of backlash against dissenters and protesters. Jehovah's Witnesses, labor
picketers, and others who challenged the status quo have faced measures
designed to curb their public dissent and protect activities." During the civil
rights era, various measures were adopted or enforced, particularly in
southern states, to prohibit civil rights organizations from organizing,
forming, protesting, and criticizing government. In general, public unrest
and division tend to give rise to anti-protest measures. These recent
examples show that the managerial impulse runs deep and is especially
likely to be triggered during eras of sharp public contention.
86. See Alexander Sammon, A History of Native Americans Protesting the Dakota Access
Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Sep 9, 2016, 6:16 PM), https://perma.cc/RBU2-SESY (examining the events
that led to the pipeline protests); Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police
Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-
darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html (explaining events that led to the Ferguson
protests); Gregory Krieg, Police Injured, More Than 200 Arrested at Trump Inauguration Protests in
DC, CNN (Jan. 21, 2017,4:06 AM), https://perma.cc/5AZ4-445S (examining events surrounding arrests
of protesters at Trump inauguration).
87. For descriptions of early cases involving restrictions on the expressive rights of Jehovah's
Witnesses, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why
Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431,
443-51 (2006). Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 133, 150-59 (1993); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938)
(invalidating ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature on public streets). For a discussion of early
limits on labor picketing, see DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1870-1920
(1999).
88. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965) (invalidating the conviction of a leader of
civil rights group seeking to protest racial segregation); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (invalidating state libel laws); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (invalidating
breach ofpeace convictions against civil rights protesters); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)
(invalidating Virginia law that restricted solicitation of clients for purposes of challenging racial
segregation in public schools); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961) (invalidating breach of
peace convictions in sit-in case on procedural due process grounds).
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We appear to have entered another such era. To the extent cultural and
political attitudes concerning dissent emanate from the top, President
Trump's actions and rhetoric have contributed to the backlash. As
President, Trump has signed executive orders authorizing significant
funding for militarizing local police forces.89 The Justice Department has
aggressively investigated and prosecuted anti-Trump inaugural protesters
under "conspiracy to riot" laws that carry substantial prison terms. 90
President Trump has also blocked dissenting voices from his Twitter
account, precipitating a First Amendment lawsuit.9 ' Further, as discussed
below, President Trump has weighed in multiple times against NFL players
who silently protested during pre-game renditions of the national anthem. 92
The president has suggested that the players be fired or suspended for their
acts of dissent.93
Public rhetoric matches these actions. Candidate Trump invited
attendees at his campaign rallies to literally "rough up" protesters. 94
Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump fashioned himself the
"law and order" candidate.95 The Trump Administration has refused to
condemn violence against certain protesters. 96 In the wake of Black Lives
Matter protests across the nation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
listed "black identity extremism" as a domestic terrorism threat. 97 The
Administration has steadfastly supported law enforcement officers in their
policing of public protests-including, as noted, by providing federal funds
for military equipment for use at public demonstrations.
These bills, actions, and anti-dissent rhetoric are all part of the broader
managed speech framework. The proposed laws are rooted in the
jurisprudence of managed speech, which grants officials broad authority to
89. Adam Goldman, Trump Reverses Restrictions on Military Hardware for Police, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/us/politics/trump-police-military-surplus-equip
ment.html.
90. Zick, Protests in Peril, supra note 11.
91. Carlos Ballesteros, Trump Violates First Amendment by Blocking Critics on Twitter, Legal
Experts Say, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 16, 2017, 1:21 PM), https://perma.cc/NZ3N-DAAD.
92. See infra Section II.C.
93. Associated Press, Trump Says NFL Players Should be Fired forAnthem Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/sports/trump-nfl-colin-kaepernick-.html.
94. Jenna Johnson & Mary Jordan, Trump on Rally Protester: "Maybe He Should Have Been
Roughed Up," WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/9632-GM49.
95. David A. Graham, The Shaky Basis for Trump's "Law and Order" Campaign, ATLANTIC
(July 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/DQ7N-NQ4H.
96. For instance, President Trump was slow to object after Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's security detail beat American protesters in Washington, D.C. See Laurel Raymond, Trump
Still Silent Two Days After Protesters in DC Were Brutally Assaulted by Turkish Security,
TH[NKPROGRESS (May 18, 2017, 3:59 PM), https://perna.cc/8Y5Y-PS34.
97. Khaled A. Beydoun & Justin Hansford, The FB.I. 's Dangerous Crackdown on 'Black
Identity Extremists,' N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/opinion/black-
identity-extremism-fbi-trump.html.
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control public dissent and protest. The Administration's acts and anti-
protest rhetoric are also redolent of the traditional preference for silent, non-
disruptive, and non-threatening forms of dissent. The unmistakable
message is that even minor acts of civil disobedience will be met with
severe punishment. These acts and attitudes chill dissent by suggesting the
possibility of harsh penalties or even bodily injury for those who step out
of line. They blur the space between peaceful protest and racketeering, and
between lawful dissent and terrorism.
Public opinion polling suggests that Americans, while supportive of free
speech generally, are somewhat ambivalent about certain forms of dissent.
For example, in a recent poll, a majority responded that a person who burns
the U.S. flag should lose their citizenship and that controversial speakers
should be banned from campus if students are likely to engage in violent
protests in response to the speaker's presence." Polling also suggests that
Americans are ambivalent about protest movements. As one organization
that tracks public opinion regarding protest movements has observed, "the
public's overall attitude regarding mass demonstrations seems to range
from skepticism to outright condemnation."9 This is true regardless of the
movement's agenda. Thus, civil rights, anti-war, and economic justice mass
protests have all received similarly low levels of support from the American
public. In sum, at least according to opinion polls, Americans prefer
managed dissent to protest that upsets, stirs to anger, or unsettles.' 00
These examples and findings show that the Supreme Court is not the
only institution that has adopted and enforced a managed speech
framework. Backed by the public order management system and a measure
of public opinion, legislators have proposed increasingly speech- and
assembly-suppressive laws. Executive officials have aggressively pursued
anti-government protesters. The prevailing attitude concerning public
contention and dissent seems to be this: public protest and dissent should
be allowed, so long as it does not block intersections, keep individuals from
attending scheduled events, take up too much space, get too close to
intended audiences, make too much noise, or cost too much to police.
98. See Emily Ekins, The State of Free Speech and Tolerance in America, CATO INST. (Oct. 31,
2017), https://perma.cc/FK4D-PZCR (reporting findings of Recent Cato Institute survey of public
attitudes concerning free speech).
99. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Going Too Far: The American Public's Attitudes
Toward Protest Movements, CORNELL UNtv., https://perma.cc/2A7M-759Z. (last visited Apr. 5, 2018).
100. Id.
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B. Managing Campus Dissent
In the United States, there is a long tradition of dissent and protest on
public university campuses. o' As has been true outside the campus gates,
there have been efforts to crack down on dissident expression and protest-
in particular, during the civil rights and Vietnam eras.1 0 2 Contrary to
suggestions that colleges were once open forums for expression, and have
only recently become less supportive of free expression, campuses have
actually experienced significant bouts of repression. As many have
observed, public universities are facing new challenges in terms of student
dissent and protest. The subject has received considerable attention in
various media, and I will not attempt to examine campus free speech
controversies in detail. I will focus instead on some of the most salient
aspects of the management of campus dissent.
1. The Campus Order Management System
Public universities are unique places. Unlike other public properties,
such as streets and parks, they exist primarily to ensure that students receive
proper instruction and education in various disciplines. That said, as public
institutions, universities are presumably subject to at least some of the
constraints imposed by the First Amendment. Thus, students enjoy some
free speech, association, press, and petition rights on campuses. 10 3 Those
rights may of course be tempered or even restricted by the institution's
interests in order, safety, and academic freedom.
During the 1960s, university campuses experienced significant
disruption as a result of civil rights protests. 104 The Free Speech Movement
at the University of California at Berkeley originated as a result of students'
clashes with administrators, who had prohibited public protests except in
certain areas on campus.o0 In particular, the students objected to the
designation of small free speech areas that could be used for student
protests. The Free Speech Movement ultimately prevailed against these
101. For an overview of student activism from the American Revolution to the 1950s, see
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, REBELLION IN THE UNIVERSITY chs.4-5 (1976). I will focus on public
institutions, which are formally governed at least to some extent by the First Amendment. However, my
criticisms of managed speech on campus apply also to private colleges and universities, which generally
express their commitment to First Amendment principles and values.
102. See generally KENNETH J. HEINEMAN, PUT YOUR BODIES UPON THE WHEEL: STUDENT
REVOLT IN THE 1960s (2001).
103. See generally Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101
MINN. L. REV. 1801 (2017).
104. See HEINEMAN, supra note 102.
105. For an account of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, see ROBERT COHEN & REGINALD E.
ZELNIK, EDS., THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT: REFLECTIONS ON BERKELEY IN THE 1960s (2002).
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strict limitations on public expression. Across the nation, students thereafter
participated in sit-ins, pickets, demonstrations, and strikes.
Episodes such as the Free Speech Movement show that campuses are
subject to the same kinds of convulsions and conditions that affect public
dissent in other contexts. One disturbing recent trend, thoroughly
documented by organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union and
the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), is an institutional
crackdown on student dissent. What I have referred to as the "public order
management system"-essentially, the bureaucracy that curbs and limits
public protest and dissent in public places-has largely been imported onto
university campuses.
Under the "campus order management system," many universities apply
something like public forum and time, place, and manner principles to the
open spaces of campus-quads, plazas, and other spaces that students could
use for public protests.106 This managed speech regime includes the full
panoply of managed speech mechanisms that are used in public places-
free speech zoning, permitting requirements, time limits, size limits, noise
regulations, etc. University policies typically contain, at a minimum, a
"Public Forum Policy," an "Advertising, Distribution and Solicitation
Policy," and a "Policy on Speakers and Facilities Usage."'0 o These policies
are enforced to manage and control public contention on university
campuses. Penalties for failure to comply with such policies range from the
denial of a permit application to student expulsion. These and other
regulations affect expressive activities ranging from pamphleteering to
sizeable protests.
Free speech zoning has been a prevalent managerial tactic on
campuses.' FIRE and the ACLU have been instrumental in challenging
efforts to "zone" campus dissent. Yet, on many university campuses, free
speech zoning persists. Campuses comprising tens of thousands of acres
have sought to limit student speech to just a few small areas. For example,
at one point Texas Tech University had designated a "free speech area" on
its campus of 28,000 students and 2,000 acres that comprised
approximately 400 square feet.' 09 This was the only space on campus where
students were permitted to speak without advance permission. University
administrators often defend these measures on the ground that they prevent
"disruption."
106. See ZICK, SPEECH OuTr OF DOORS, supra note 3, at 273-76.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 277-81.
109. See id. at 278 (establishing Texas Tech University's student body size and acreage); Roberts
v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 866 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (stating that the "free speech area" was
approximately 400 square feet).
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Campus officials have also sought to manage student dissent through
"speech codes.""o Although campus "speech codes" were invalidated by
several federal courts in the 1990s, there is some evidence that officials
retained or even continued to adopt them. One study from the early 2000s
suggested that many universities retained portions of their speech codes
even after similar provisions had been invalidated by federal courts."'
More remarkably, some universities initially adopted their speech codes
after these court decisions.11 2 Today, the regulation of offensive speech is
accomplished through "codes of conduct," sexual harassment policies, and
other disciplinary rules. According to a 2006 FIRE study, ninety-three
percent of universities surveyed still prohibited speech that is protected
under the First Amendment." 3
Universities have also used a variety of other means, including
standardless licensing schemes, fees, notice and registration requirements,
and restrictions on "outsider" speech, to contain and manage dissent on
campus.11 4 Some university regulations require advance presentation of any
materials to be displayed. Protest organizations may also be required to
meet with administrators prior to events, in order to discuss the nature of
the proposed event and negotiate its logistical terms."' Advance notice
requirements can range from twenty-four hours to up to two weeks. Further,
specific code provisions may grant officials the authority to deny permits
for any expression that does not serve or benefit the entire university
community.' 6 In all of these and in other respects, places of higher learning
exhibit the same suppressive tendencies that influence regulation of
expression in other public places.
2. Managing Outside Voices
With specific regard to the diversity of voices that can be heard on
university campuses, universities vary widely in their approaches to outside
speakers or what some call "non-university entities.""' Many permit
members of the public and other "non-university entities" to use at least
some campus spaces. Others restrict outsiders' access to those invited or
110. See ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 3, at 271-73.
111. See Jon B. Gould, The Precedent That Wasn't: College Hate Speech Codes and the Tvwo
Faces ofLegal Compliance, 35 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 345, 345-46 (2001).
112. Id. at 345.
113. FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDuc., SPOTLIGHT ON SPEECH CODES IN 2006: THE
STATE OF FREE SPEECH ON OUR NATION'S CAMPUSES 1-3 (2006).
114. See ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 3, at 274-76 (discussing restrictions).
115. Id. at 274.
116. See Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 865 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Pro-Life Cougars v.
Univ. ofHous., 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
117. See ZICK, SPEECH Our OF DOORS, supra note 3, at 276.
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affiliated with student organizations. Still other universities impose broader
restrictions, effectively denying outsider access." 8
American universities are once again roiling with free speech
conflicts." 9 Some of those conflicts relate to outside speakers. Many
universities have rescinded invitations to outside speakers, some of whom
had been invited to campus by students.' 2 0 Controversial speakers,
including the avowed white supremacist Richard Spencer and provocateurs
like Milo Yiannapolous, have planned events on campuses, some of which
have been canceled.121
Universities fear the potential disruption, including the threat of
violence, controversial speakers may bring in their wake. They worry about
their ability to provide adequate security and the considerable expense of
doing so (which can run to millions of dollars in some cases). Not
surprisingly, they have turned to managerial tools to try to resolve conflicts
relating to outside speakers.
Students concerned about the harms associated with offensive and
denigrating speech have also taken certain steps to manage outside speakers
on their campuses. Polling shows relatively strong support among the
current generation of college students for silencing speech that offends
minorities or makes students uncomfortable.' 22 One poll suggests that a
majority of college students think it is acceptable to take action-including
shouting down the speaker-in order to prevent someone from
communicating opinions or ideas with which they disagree.' 23 These
polling results are consistent with some recent incidents on college
campuses. In some cases, students have physically blocked controversial
speakers' access to venues or attempted to assault them.1 24 Students have
also interrupted or yelled over speakers in an effort to prevent them from
118. Id.
119. See GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF THE
AMERICAN DEBATE (2014); ERWIN CHEMERrNSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
(2017).
120. See LUKIANOFF, supra note 13, at 29-36 (2014) (discussing "disinvitation season" on
university campuses).
121. Susan Svrluga, UC-Berkeley Says "Free Speech Week" is Canceled Milo Yiannopolous Says
He's Coming Anyway," WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/T69E-MJB5.
122. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 119, at 12 ("We can confirm what the Pew
Research Center reported in November 2015: this generation of college students is much more
supportive of censoring offensive statements about minorities and much less supportive of protecting
speech that makes some students uncomfortable.").
123. See Johnathan Villasenor, Views Among College Students Regarding the First Amendment:
Results From A New Survey, BROOKINGS (Sep. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/QZ33-SGR7.
124. See, e.g., Peter Beinart, A Violent Attack on Free Speech at Middlebury, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6,
2017), https://perma.cc/5J7U-H5F9.
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communicating with audiences. 125 Indeed, owing to the sheer number of
such incidents on college campuses, one commentator dubbed the 2016-17
academic year "the year of the shout-down." 26
In response to shout-down and other disruptive actions by students,
some universities have adopted policies that restrict the kinds of expressive
disruption students may engage in at campus events.1 2 7 Thus, administrators
have responded to student efforts to manage outside speech by adopting
policies that manage student management of speech. These policies are the
latest additions to the campus order management system discussed earlier.
The outside speaker controversies are part of a broader debate on
university campuses over freedom from speech.1 28 These controversies
raise difficult First Amendment questions relating to university officials'
authority to exclude outside speakers. They also raise unresolved questions
about whether there is a First Amendment right to heckle a speaker, which
includes a right to drown out controversial speech altogether. First
Amendment scholars have noted the surprising dearth of authorities relating
to the rights of counter-protesters and hecklers.' 29
Students using disruptive counter-protests to interfere with controversial
speech may or may not be within their First Amendment rights when doing
so. However, their speech serves the same purpose as other measures
intended to exclude controversial speech and speakers from campus. What
is more, the shout-down tactic evinces the same sort of lack of tolerance
that many university policies communicate regarding student dissent. In
other words, students exhibiting managerial intolerance may simply be
imitating their local administrators, who have in many cases responded to
controversial dissent with repression.
Whatever the ultimate answers to these First Amendment questions may
be, there is no question that administrators and students alike are invoking
measures that are intended to manage and curb controversial speech on
campuses. The campus order management system, which is rooted in public
forum and time, place, and manner doctrines, serves as the backdrop for
administrators' responses. Students, as physical and expressive disruptors,
sometimes also seek to manage access and communication by outsiders.
125. See Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, ACLU Speaker Shouted Down at William & Mary, INSIDE HIGHER
ED Oct. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/4UBZ-UHA2 (reporting an incident in which Black Lives Matter
protesters shouted down an ACLU representative).
126. Stanley Kurtz, Year of the Shout-Down: It Was Worse Than You Think, NAT'L REV. (May
31, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://perma.cc/GPZ8-WJUE.
127. Todd Richmond, University of Wisconsin Approves Free Speech Policy That Punishes
Student Protesters, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 6, 2017, 8:19 PM), http://perma.cc/UC34-HPH9.
128. See LUKIANOFF, supra note 13, at 1.
129. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE REVISITED (2017), https://perma.
cc/K6VK-JU6N.
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They attempt to control or silence voices they dislike or find offensive.
Administrators, in response, are moving to limit or punish students'
disruptive actions.
C Managing Political Orthodoxy
The lessons university students learn regarding free expression and the
value of dissent will undoubtedly carry forward into their post-university
lives.1 30 Insofar as students are learning that dissent need not be tolerated,
or that the appropriate response to ideas one does not like is to drown them
out or otherwise suppress them, American society will continue to confront
issues relating to the proper response to public expressions of dissent and
protest.
One recent example is the conflict over whether NFL athletes must or
ought to stand at respectful attention during the pre-game playing of the
national anthem and flag ceremonies. Colin Kaepernick and other players
took a knee or made other non-disruptive gestures of dissent during pre-
game ceremonies.' 3 ' As the athletes explained, they were not protesting the
flag, the nation, or the U.S. military but rather what they considered
examples of police brutality-specifically, what they believed to be
unjustified shootings of African-Americans in several high-profile cases.' 32
The NFL protests received increased national attention after President
Trump weighed in via Twitter. President Trump has tweeted frequently
about the issue, urging that any dissenting player-whom he described in
one tweet as a "son of a bitch"-be suspended or fired for showing
"disrespect" for the national anthem, the flag, and the nation's military. 3 3
Depending on which opinion poll one consults and how it is constructed, a
majority of the American public may actually support President Trump's
general position that kneeling is disrespectful and unpatriotic.1 34
Note that in this particular instance, the rationale for objecting to dissent
cannot be that the protests are disruptive-for example, in the way that
mass social movement demonstrations can be. Taking a knee does not
disrupt the playing of the anthem, the saluting of the flag, or the actual game
itself. Rather, the principal objection seems to be the audience's view that
130. See Lukianoff, supra note 119, at 7 ("What happens on campus doesn't stay on campus.").
131. Vann R. Newkirk II, No Country for Colin Kdepernick, ATLANTIC (Aug. 11, 2017), https://
perma.cc/T5GE-X5QP.
132. Eric Reid, Why Colin Kaepernick and IDecided to Take a Knee, N.Y TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/opinion/colin-kaepernick-football-protests.html.
133. Jeremy Gottlieb & Mark Maske, Roger Goodell Responds to Trump's Call to 'Fire' NFL
Players Protesting During National Anthem, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/QUP4-ES
7R.
134. Kathryn Casteel, How Do Americans Feel About the NFL Protests? It Depends on How You
Ask, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 9, 2017, 5:58 AM), https://perma.cc/TE5J-KYEK.
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even silent forms of public dissent and protest during the national anthem
are inappropriate, disrespectful, or unpatriotic.
The NFL is a private organization, and for that reason the controversy
does not formally or technically involve the First Amendment. However,
as some have observed, President Trump has crept closer and closer to the
constitutional line in encouraging that kneeling players be benched or
terminated.' " Whether or not the First Amendment formally applies, the
official and public reactions to these acts of dissent implicate core free
speech principles and values. In West Virginia State Board ofEducation v.
Barnette,'36 the Supreme Court invalidated state laws mandating that school
children salute the United States flag. Barnette is part of the First
Amendment canon. It is an iconic affirmation of a core right to dissent with
respect to and resist majoritarian ideas regarding politics, patriotism, and
nationalism. That affirmation is worth highlighting in the context of the
NFL protests.
In response to the state's argument that its interest in national unity
overrode the students' right to object on religious and other grounds to the
mandatory flag salute, Barnette said that "[s]truggles to coerce uniformity
of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and
country have been waged by many good as well as by evil men."37 As
Justice Jackson wrote for the Court: "Those who begin coercive elimination
of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."' 3 8 In
one of the best known passages in our First Amendment jurisprudence,
Barnette concluded: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."l39
Judging by the reaction to the NFL protests, the sitting president and
many Americans do not share or indeed may have rejected Barnette's anti-
orthodoxy principle. President Trump and others insist that individuals
stand at attention while the national anthem is performed. Some adamantly
insist that Americans think of the sacrifices of military personnel while the
anthem plays. Some undoubtedly do so. But as Barnette concludes, a
central point of that sacrifice was to preserve the right to decide for
ourselves how we will react to our government and its symbols. As the
135. See Robert Post, Do Trump's NFL Attacks Violate the First Amendment?, POLITCO (Sept.
27, 2017), https://perma.cc/3WMV-522IC
136. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
137. Id. at 640.
138. Id. at 641.
139. Id. at 642.
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Court stated in Barnette, insisting (as President Trump and others have) on
a particular response "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all
official control."1 4 0
III. THE PROSPECTS FOR "DYNAMIC DIVERSITY"
As the discussion thus far suggests, Americans have a complicated
relationship with public dissent. We celebrate the virtues and victories of
American dissenters, including our revolutionary ancestors. We are justly
proud of our First Amendment right to dissent. We point to that right as
evidence that we are a free people-freer, in fact, than citizens of other
nations.
However, if we Americans were to be honest with ourselves, we would
acknowledge that our right to dissent is in some respects severely
challenged. It is undermined by a managed speech regime that is deeply
rooted in precedents, attitudes, laws, bureaucracies, and cultural norms
concerning free expression. In just the three contexts I have examined,
Americans have imposed increasingly restrictive controls on public
contention, reserved the greatest protection for non-disruptive forms of
expression, excluded controversial outside speakers, and supported a
national political orthodoxy. In the opening lines of his book, Professor
Magarian writes: "If a democracy doesn't make noise, it dies." 4 ' In many
respects, Americans are noisy and boisterous folk. But when it comes to
public dissent, it seems many support making noise so long as it is not too
loud, too raucous, or too disruptive.
This Article highlights the challenges for Professor Magarian's
proposed alternative to managed speech, which he calls "dynamic
diversity."l42 The approach calls for facilitating a diversity of ideas and a
diversity of participation in public discussions.' 43 Dynamic diversity
envisions a free speech jurisprudence that facilitates public debate in ways
that "spur political change."'" Professor Magarian argues that "we need
First Amendment law to protect marginal, dissident, outsider voices."'45 He
advocates a free speech framework that does not "merely bar government
from restricting speech but requires, or at least presses, the government to
promote speech." 4 6 Among other things, this approach would entail
140. Id.
141. MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at xi.
142. Id. at 227.
143. Id. at 239.
144. Id. at 240.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 241.
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facilitating greater access to government preserves such as public streets
and parks.
As is fitting for a book about the Roberts Court, Professor Magarian's
"dynamic diversity" model focuses primarily on what the Supreme Court
might do to further the goals of dynamic diversity. 14 7 Thus, Professor
Magarian advocates a shift in the Court's "center of gravity" from well-
heeled speakers "to dissenters and outsider speakers." 48 He wants the Court
to "prioritize strong First Amendment protection for dissenters and outsider
speakers," including "[s]treet protesters" and "campus agitators." 49 As he
observes, Court decisions following the dynamic diversity approach would
not "treat[] speech that challenges the status quo as a threat to social order,"
but rather as a powerful means of effecting social change.""so Among other
things, Professor Magarian urges the future Court to "restore expressive
rights in public places" by "treat[ing] free expression not as an inconvenient
encroachment on public spaces but as a primary purpose of those
spaces.""'
This will be an uphill climb. As I have noted, the Roberts Court did not
pioneer the managed speech approach. Some of its decisions may have
exacerbated its effects, but managed speech is part of a deep and stubbornly
attached root system.'5 2 Particularly as it relates to public protest and public
contention, managed speech is now deeply entrenched in our First
Amendment jurisprudence. However, even if future Courts fail to adopt the
doctrines and principles of dynamic diversity, the approach merits
consideration.
Indeed, the most useful venues for contemplating and perhaps adopting
the principles of dynamic diversity may be located outside and beyond the
Supreme Court. Judicial decisions that facilitate a diversity of ideas and
participants would likely effect some degree of change on the ground. But
in our streets, on our campuses, and in the context of national social and
political conflicts, it will take more than a handful of Supreme Court
decisions to facilitate a path to something like dynamic diversity. It will
take much larger-scale institutional and attitudinal transformations.
The fundamental principles of dynamic diversity could help to bring the
necessary changes about. As a society literally built on protest and dissent,
we do need to focus attention on speakers who are outsiders, who challenge
147. Id. at 243.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 243-44.
150. Id. at 244.
151. Id. at 250.
152. 1 have encountered this problem in my work on the public forum doctrine and the treatment
of cross-border expression. See ZICK, SPEECH Our OF DOORS, supra note 3; ZICK, THE COSMOPOLITAN
FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 79.
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the status quo, and who bring disruption to our streets, campuses, and
athletic stadiums. We need not give them free reign; but we ought to
provide the space necessary to bring a diversity of views and a diversity of
participants to public places.
Speech managers, including legislators who write laws designed to curb
public protest, significantly constrain public discussion and diminish public
participation. As Professor Magarian suggests, "only the organization and
hierarchy necessary for a vigorous exchange of ideas should structure
public debate.""' Public forums are already difficult places to engage in
effective protest and dissent. Imposing additional onerous requirements and
enhancing the penalties for engaging in what are often minor acts of civil
disobedience will further chill these activities.
Legislators ought to resist the urge to impose draconian penalties for acts
of civil and political disobedience. Disruption has limits, and officials can
enforce existing public order and safety laws. But the bills and proposals
discussed earlier seem designed not simply to maintain order, but to chill
public dissent and expression. Applying racketeering laws and immunizing
drivers who plow into protesters is not really about maintaining order.
These measures penalize dissent and make protest more onerous or even
physically perilous. They are part of a dangerous trend that threatens to chill
a valuable means of effectuating social change. Civil rights and other
activists need to pressure legislators to reject this approach as antithetical
to the First Amendment and dangerous to constitutional liberty.
Managing public protest and dissent on college campuses has not taken
on the same draconian overtones. However, as discussed earlier,
administrators have adopted many of the managerial techniques that are
used outside the campus gates to control dissent within them. Speech-
friendly rules and procedures, which need not follow court decisions
mandating adoption, could allow for robust exchanges in the open expanses
of campus properties.
Again, this does not mean that student speakers are entitled to protest
whenever, wherever, and however they wish. Officials are obligated to
maintain a level of order and decorum consistent with their educational
goals. But insisting on detailed permits, excluding certain speech and
speakers, and erecting tiny free speech zones for campuses that cover
thousands of acres are not measures designed for that purpose. Rather, they
are vestiges of a managed speech framework that impose order at the
expense of diverse and robust public debate.
153. MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at xix.
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As Professor Magarian observes, "[m]anaged speech treats outsider
speakers as useless at best and dangerous at worst." 5 4 Too often this has
seemed to be the attitude of campus administrators and students alike.
Dynamic diversity "rejects the managed speech tendency to scorn outside
speakers." '5 Both administrators and students should recognize that
speakers from outside the community can enhance the diversity of
participants and ideas on campus. That does not mean anyone necessarily
has a right to speak on campus, or that students must remain silent in the
presence of speakers who do come to campus. But institutions of higher
learning ought not to fear outsiders who come to "challenge existing
institutions and power arrangements." 56
Without embracing the substance of every speaker's message, university
communities could broadly welcome outside entities and participants.
Students should of course have some latitude to dissent, perhaps including
through disruptive expression. But they should not be permitted to silence
outside speakers through violent acts or physical access barriers. At the
same time, administrators ought to resist the urge to punish students who
are not as welcoming as they ought to be by enacting punitive policies.
Controversies regarding outside speakers can be effective "teaching
moments." Students, faculty, and administrators can all learn something
about tolerance, freedom of expression, and equality from these
controversies.
Last, and perhaps most importantly, there must be a transformation in
the way Americans process and interpret public dissent. During periods of
contention, legislators reflexively seek to impose greater limits on public
protests. This bespeaks a public attitude of intolerance toward civil
disobedience and dissent. University administrators likewise turn to the
campus order management system to control dissent on campus. According
to some recent opinion polling, many university students share this same
sort of intolerance for dissent.'57 The polling suggests the rather urgent need
for universities and others to expend resources and energy to educate
students concerning the values of freedom of speech.
As the conflict concerning NFL protests demonstrates, the cultural
preference for polite and orthodox displays is deeply entrenched in
American society. The urge to suppress public dissent emanates from all
walks of life and all points on the political spectrum. In order to foster
societal and political change, dissent must have adequate breathing space.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Catherine Rampell, A Chilling Study Shows Sow Hostile College Students Are Toward
Free Speech, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/4UYS-GJ52.
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As Professor Magarian observes: "For dynamic diversity, disruption
defines much of expressive freedom's value."'58 Disruption need not be
physical. It can operate at the level of mental processes and reactions. We
need to ask why taking a knee during the national anthem so deeply
affronts, and why this act of dissent cannot at least be tolerated even if
people cannot fully support it. If there really is no room in our society for
peaceful, symbolic gestures of this sort, then dynamic diversity is going to
be a real moonshot.
As trivial as it may seem, the NFL protest example encapsulates perhaps
the biggest challenge for dynamic diversity. Scholars have shown that
Supreme Court decisions generally tend to follow public opinion rather
than shape it.' 59 If this is correct, and if the body politic is not open to a
diversity of ideas and participants, there is little chance the Supreme Court
will alter its course. Dynamic diversity must first take root with the
participants and institutions whose actions are broadly framed by
constitutional rules and values, but whose laws and policies give those
things actual force. And it must follow significant changes in the way the
American public views, reacts to, and tolerates public dissent.
CONCLUSION
As Professor Magarian's study demonstrates, the dissenting speaker has
not been the primary focus of First Amendment jurisprudence during the
first decade or so of the Roberts Court. During prior eras, the Supreme
Court did sometimes wax rhetorical on the importance of maintaining
robust dissenters' rights. It put Jehovah's Witnesses, civil rights protesters,
and others who challenged the status quo front and center. But in truth, even
these revered dissenters were tolerated only insofar as they did not pose any
threat of actual disruption or otherwise upset the social order in the course
of expressing dissent. In general, the First Amendment protected the
Witnesses' and civil rights protesters' non-truculent expression, so long as
it was conveyed in a place the speakers had a right to be and without any
aggressive intentions.
Later, with the Court's blessing, officials constructed a public order
management system that neutralized and significantly stymied public
dissent. Order became the order of the day. Disruption could not be
tolerated. It had to be maintained, controlled, and managed. Today, this
system is pervasive on our streets, on our campuses, and in our stadiums.
We see it in the raft of legislative proposals for burdening and further
158. MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at xx.
159. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
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marginalizing public dissent. We see it in law enforcement tactics, which
continue to use militarized methods to police and manage public dissent.
We see it on our campuses, which have largely adopted a bureaucracy of
management that applies to student speech from the quad to the classroom.
Even some students have asserted a form of managerial authority, in
blocking our ousting controversial speakers or speech. Finally, peaceful and
non-disruptive athlete protests have been met with outrage, derision, and
threats of adverse employment actions.
Professor Magarian rightly decries the Roberts Court's embrace,
perpetuation, and in some cases exacerbation, of managed speech doctrines
and principles. His "dynamic diversity" proposal encompasses the basic
prerequisites for meaningful constitutional discourse and change. We do
need more diverse messages and participants. Were a future Court to chart
a course by the lights of "dynamic diversity," we could experience some
marginal change in the status and rights of dissenters. However, real change
in this regard must come not from courts but from legislators, executive
officials, campus administrators, students, and the public at large-all of
whom will need to provide more breathing space for dissent in their
respective communities.
My prognosis has admittedly been mostly negative. But there may yet
be hope for public dissent and dynamic diversity. Most of the bills to curb
and punish public protesters have failed to garner majority support in state
legislatures. Activists continue to risk arrest and detention to exercise rights
to protest and dissent. Although a vocal and disruptive minority of college
students have stolen the recent headlines, not all in that community agree
that controversial speech is something to be avoided or exiled. Efforts to
teach and educate students, without condescension or judgment, about the
values of dissent and dynamic diversity must be part of a program to
preserve and protect dissent. Americans like to disagree with one another.
Now more than ever, they need to be reminded of the importance of
preserving the right to express opinions at variance with those commonly
or officially held.
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